Voluntary Tax-compliance Behavior in SMEs; Evidence from Pakistan and Turkey

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ARTICLE DETAILS

ABSTRACT

This research article aims at exploring the Voluntary Tax-compliance behaviour of the small and medium size business enterprises for two countries, Pakistan and Turkey. Voluntary tax-compliance from SME’s is considered as major risk area by the tax-collection authorities of both developing and developed countries, authorities from both desire to bring individuals belonging to SME’s to pay taxes on voluntary basis, in order to generate higher revenues for their governments. Thus, data was collected from the owners of SME’s of both countries through questionnaire, data thus collected was analysed using SPSS and PLS-Smart. The results suggested that voluntary tax-compliance can be achieved by building a mutual trust relation and by exercising legitimate use of power by the tax authorities, results also signifies that subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, attitude towards taxes and moral obligation are also key factors in determining the voluntary tax-compliance behaviour as suggested by Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, (2008). Also, this article tests the mediating role of the intention in building positive voluntary tax-compliance behaviour as suggested by Ajzen (1991). This study is important contribution in literature as it incorporates data from two countries, Pakistan (a developing nation) and Turkey (that is making its mark in the list of developed countries). This research work can be further extended by incorporating comparative analysis among the business owners belonging to developed, semi-developed and developing countries.

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1. Introduction

Taxes are inevitable drive to run government, as it can gear money into economic system to foster revenue generation and hence growth (Slemrod, Rehman and Waseem, 2020). Tax-compliance can be seen as an important field of study as for developing nation, it is primly important to turn...
“ghost” tax-payers inclined towards paying taxes, as they have potential income to become tax-payer but do not pay taxes because they lack trust on government officials, which ultimately becomes reason for their non-compliance (Gangl, Hofmann and Kirchler, 2015). Though it is utmost desire of the authorities of the developing and developed countries to bring individuals to pay taxes (Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen, 2014; Bornman and Ramutumbu, 2019). Small and medium size enterprise (SMEs) are considered as utmost desire of every country to be added in tax-system as they possess major portion of the economic fabric from size and income prospective (Bornman and Ramutumbu, 2019).

Compliance can be foster by analysing and in-depth research on behavioural aspect of individuals (Batrancea et al., 2019). One of the major cause of non-compliance is trust issue among the authorities and individuals, individuals in developing countries perceive their authorities corrupt (Waris, 2013), thus they don’t believe that their hard-earned money will be utilised in good faith of nation building (Waris and Abdul, 2014). Mutual trust can be developed among taxpayers and authorities only by good governance (OECD, 2010). Kirchler et al., (2008) narrated that by building mutual trust relationship government and authorities can foster better compliance from taxpayers. Another factor that has been identified by the researchers is use of power by the governments. Power by the government can be exercised in two ways, legitimate or coercive (Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler, and Schabmann, 2013). Using legitimate power government can improve voluntary compliance behaviour.

Pakistan a developing nation is faced by the same dilemma of voluntary non-compliance behaviour (Malik, and Younus, 2019). Same issue has been discussed by the researchers belonging to Turkey (Olsen, 2015; Batrancea et al., 2019; Al-Ttaffi, 2020). Sometimes government use enforced power for better compliance towards taxes (Batrancea et al., 2019), but some researchers have also suggested that power enforcement does not result in building confidence of individuals on the government (Batrancea et al., 2019). Thus, it has been suggested by the researchers such as (Malik, and Younus, 2019) for Pakistani government and (Al-Ttaffi, 2020) for Turkish government, to adopt different strategies to make individuals more obedient taxpayers. The role of trust and power has also been emphasized by the Slippery Slope Framework formulised by Kirchler et al., (2008).

To ascertain any behaviour, intention plays a very important role Ajzen (1991). Therefore, this article explains the role of tax-compliance intention in fostering tax-compliance behaviour. Theory of planned behaviour narrated that every action/behaviour of individual is based on intention, and intentions are formulated by attitude, perceived behavioural control, moral obligation and subjective norms (Ju, Qin and Spector, 2018). These variables will be further discussed in literature review section.

2. Literature Review

Tax-compliance behaviour has been narrated by the researchers from multiple perspectives, studies related to tax-compliance behaviour were firstly identified by the economics scholars, but with the passage of time phenomenon of tax-compliance become famous among the researchers belonging to the field of sociology, psychology and business studies (K. Devos, 2014). Greater reinforcement efforts by the authorities can result in building better tax-compliance behaviour (Malik, and Younus, 2019). This, study based on Slippery slope framework Kirchler et al., (2008) and Theory of planned behaviour proposed by Ajzen (1991), studies the mediating role intention among trust, legitimate power, coercive power, attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control, moral obligation and voluntary tax-compliance behaviour. These variables are discussed below.
An individual contribution of money for tax is always a serious concerning matter in their sight; it is perceived that their intention to compliance can only be obtained on their past experiences of exchange that will definitely help them to develop their positive attitudes towards tax paying (Halim, Ahmad, Katmun and Jaafar, H, 2015). An individual’s intention towards paying taxes is influenced by his attitude, which can be linked with an incident of satisfaction that one has perceived from paying taxes (Onu, 2016). An individual attitude for financial contribution is the most difficult to be achieved and same is the reason for the lack of intention to pay tax because taxpayers don’t have a complying attitude towards taxation system (Akram, Malik, Shareef and Goraya, 2019). Thus, it can be hypothesized that

$H_1$: Attitude towards has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour

$H_{1a}$: Attitude towards tax-compliance has positive significant relationship towards tax-compliance behaviour with the mediating effect of tax-compliance intention.

Authorities by using coercive power can guarantee compliance but it will be forced one, trust of the citizens is negatively associated with coercive power if exercised by the authorities which ultimately results in tax-theft rather than compliance behaviour (Kastlunger et al., 2013). However, by utilizing legitimate power authorities can foster voluntary compliance and a long run relation based on trust (Kastlunger et al., 2013).

Compliance behaviour for paying taxes is more effectively seen during exertion of power of government authority as compare to the state of trust; as when government exerts influence of powers then the individual payers cannot show deviation of behaviours because they know the consequences that they have to bear in result of showing reluctance in behaviours (Tjondro, Setiabudi and Joyo, 2019). Enforced power is the obligatory influence of government exerted on the individuals so that they will show willingness for paying taxes and in future their behaviour towards compliance would never deviate (Tjondro, et.al, 2019). Based on these facts it can be conceptualised:

$H_2$: Coercive power has negative significant relationship towards voluntary tax compliance behaviour.

$H_{2a}$: Coercive power has negative significant relationship towards voluntary tax compliance behaviour with the mediating effect of tax-compliance intention.

$H_3$: Legitimate power has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour

$H_{3a}$: Legitimate power has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour with the mediating effect of tax-compliance intention.

Individual considering tax compliance a moral duty for them has helped to increase the level of their positive intentions to pay tax; as reluctance to pay taxes will be considered by them violation of their morals (Akram et al., 2019). It is always difficult to create an environment where tax authorities can achieve tax payer’s volunteer intention to pay tax but if paying taxes is considered as a moral obligation in sight of individual payers then there will be high intentions perceived for tax compliance (Alasfour, 2019). Thus, it can be extracted;

$H_4$: Moral Obligation has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour

$H_{4a}$: Moral Obligation has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour with the mediating effect of tax-compliance intention.

Behaviours have a great impact on the individual intentions to pay taxes; intentions to compliance are reflected through the behavioural actions (Akram et al., 2019). Behaviours influence the intentions in such a way that they control negative and positive all type of associations with the tax environment; if exchange for tax is good the then behaviours influence positive intentions but when behaviours are developed negatively towards government actions then intentions will be negatively
influenced (Sadress, Bananuka, Orobia and Opiso, 2019). Behavioural controls create a great wall of hindrance for tax authorities in collecting higher tax revenues as they fail to achieve individual intentions due to lack of balanced behaviours (Musimenta, Naigaga, Bananuka and Najjuma, 2019). Thus, it can be inferred that;

\( H_5 \): Perceived behavioural control has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour

\( H_{5a} \): Perceived behavioural control has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour with the mediating effect of tax-compliance intention.

Norms are developed through societal followed actions and it does influence intentions to perform a certain action because it is performed by all other is a society or community; so it can be concluded that intention of tax compliance in a society can be measured through their norms developed for tax compliance (Inasius, 2019). If the measure of expected level of tax non-compliance intention is seen increasing in the taxpayers of a community then it means there is an influence of norms of other citizens or taxpayers of strong resistance towards taxation (Horodnic, 2018). Subjective norms develop the intentions as these norms for tax compliance are considered to be rules and regulations that are considered must to be followed (Iqbal and Sholihin, 2019). Thus, it can be conceptualized that;

\( H_6 \): Subjective Norms has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour

\( H_{6a} \): Subjective Norms has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour with the mediating effect of tax-compliance intention.

In a study conducted by Hwang, Baloglu and Tanford (2019) it was claimed that when tax collectors develop a sense of trust among tax payers that there money will be used by justified means and distributed equally they develop their strong trust and show their positive tax compliance behaviours. Attribute of trust of taxpayers on tax authorities for exchange of services shows the measure of compliance behaviour of taxpayers (Tang, Repetti and Raab, 2019). Thus, it can be hypothesized that:

\( H_7 \): Trust in authorities has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour

\( H_{7a} \): Trust in authorities has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour with the mediating effect of tax-compliance intention.

A study conducted by Akram et al., (2019) formed a strong link between intention and behaviour for tax compliance by stating that taxpayer’s intention to pay taxes can be measured through observing their compliance behaviours. Individual taxpayers’ intention for tax compliance will be high enough when the taxation system has developed taxpayers required behaviours accordingly (Musimenta et al., 2019). The behaviour for tax compliance is an activity performed with slow and strong development of intentions of individuals under the influence of control pattern of certain behavioural elements such as norms, moral obligations, attitudes and perceived behavioural control (Taing and Chang, 2020). Therefore, it can be extracted

\( H_8 \): Intention towards tax-compliance has positive significant relationship towards voluntary tax-compliance behaviour.

3. Data & Methodology

Target population of this study is the small and medium enterprises owner’s belonging to two countries, Pakistan and Turkey. Data was collected from both the countries using non-probability sampling technique known as purposive sampling. Data was collected by a questionnaire based on 43 items, consisting of adopted scales. Originally data was collected from 160 respondents from Pakistan
and 150 respondents from Turkey. Sample size was selected using g-power.

To measure the dependent variable voluntary tax-compliance behaviour a scale developed Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler, (2010) is utilized. This scale is a unidimensional scale with 5 items. The Mediating variable is Tax-compliance Intention. Tax-compliance intention was adopted from the study of Zainol, Kamil and Faridahwati, (2008). It’s also a unidimensional scale with 4 items.

The scale of Subjective norms was adopted from the study of Wu and Chen, (2005), which consists of 5 items, perceived behavioural control is adopted from Damayanti, Subekti, & Baridwan (2015), this scale consists of 3 items. Moral obligation scale was adopted from Bobek and Hatfield (2003) containing 4 items. Legitimate Power and coercive power scale were adopted from the study of Kastlunger et al., (2013) both consisting of 5 items each. Trust in Authorities taken from the study of Van and Verboon, (2010) having 7 items. Attitude scale was adopted from the study of Bobek and Hatfield (2003) consisting of 5 items. Thus, all the scales used in this study were unidimensional.

After collection of data, it was checked for any missing values. After screening of data 121 questionnaires from Pakistan and 137 questionnaires from Turkey were found useful. Data was further analysed utilising SPSS and PLS-Smart. PLS-SEM is considered most appropriate for predictive applications and theory building (Ringle, Sarstedt, Mitchell, & Gudergan, 2018), same has been suggested by (Sarstedt, Ringle, & Hair, 2017). This study used the reflective measurement model because this kind of model can best fit in measuring perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours as proposed by Jarvis, MacKenzie and Podsakoff, (2003). Thus, in this way, this study viability of using the specified software for behavioural finance perspective.

Before conducting PLS path modelling, the first step of data analysis is to validate the data in measurement model, and the second step is to estimate path coefficients and their significance in the structural model. rules for mediation are applied as suggested by baron and Kenny (1986).

4. Results and Discussion

This study followed Hair et al. (2014) for evaluating measurement model by applying the reliability and validity criteria: internal consistency reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. As recommended by Hair et al. (2016), Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity, missing value analysis was performed. Missing value analysis was performed using SPSS by applying both approaches known as item-wise as well as case-wise missing value analysis. The cases with missing values were deleted and the resulting data of 180 respondents from Pakistan and 138 respondents from Turkey were than extracted for imminent data analysis. Complete cases were omitted from the analysis because of missing values. To access sample adequacy the measure of Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin was employed. The KMO thus resulted showed value of .753, which has been characterised as ‘good’ by Field, (2009) for all 43 items. The analysis also reflected that KMO’s of respective items were also greater than .5, that is considered as good health of data to conduct more sophisticated data analysis techniques (Field, 2009) for Pakistan dataset. Whereas, for Turkey dataset KMO value appears to be .873 for 43 items, also respective KMO’s of all the items were above the minimum threshold of .5, which as per Field, (2009) reflected that dataset is in good shape for conduct of analysis. These results are reflected in Table 1.

In next phase of analysis reliability of the constructs were determined using PLS-smart. Table 2 summarises the Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability (CR), and average variance extracted (AVE) for the variables under study. The value that is considered minimum threshold for Cronbach’s alpha is .7,
as shown by the table all the reliability statistics provide satisfactory results. The value of AVE, that
determines the convergent validity of the data (Hair et al., 2014, p. 102) should also be greater than .50,
the values in Table 2 also confirms that the values from both the countries are above the minimum
threshold.

To improve the reliability statistics value as suggested by Hair et al., (2014) few items were
deleted. Items (A1, A3, A5 from attitude, SN5 from subjective norms, PBC1 and PBC2 from Perceived
Behavioural Control, PL1, PL3, PL5 from legitimate power, MO4 and MO5 from moral obligation, VTC1,
VTC3, VTC5 from voluntary tax compliance) with loadings less than .40 were deleted to increase the
validity (Hair et al., 2014), for Pakistan data. Whereas, for Turkey data there were very few items were
dropped based on reliability, these items include such as (A4 and A5 from attitude, SN1 and SN5 from
subjective norms, MO4 and MO5 from Moral Obligation, PC5 and PC5 from coercive Power, PL1 and PL3
from legitimate Power TCI 4 and TVC 5 were deleted), deleting of items does not conclude change in
meaningfulness of the latent construct, originality of the construct remains the same as long the
reliability and validity constructs provide sufficient results (Hair et al., 2014; Jarvis et al., 2003). Table 2
displays that values of all the constructs are within acceptable range.

Last step in accessing the goodness of fit of the measurement model is to check discriminant
validity, which satisfy the claim that each construct is different from each other, two measure are
known to determine the discriminant validly, outmoded method known as Fornell and Larcker’s (1981)
and relatively advance method known heterotrait–monotrait (HTMT) that was familiarized by
estimates the correlation between constructs. If two constructs’ indicators have an HTMT value clearly
smaller than 1, it shows that these constructs are different from each other because their true
correlation is different from 1” (p. 33). Value of HTMT if less than one, is considered necessary and
sufficient condition for the constructs to be has discriminant validity. Table 3a and Table 3b reflects the
values of discriminant validity computed using PLS shows that discriminant validity criterion is met for
both the dataset.

The direct and indirect results of analysis for both Turkey and Pakistan are presented in below in Table
4 (a) and Table 4 (b) the results of these two tables provide and very interesting outcomes. Results
discloses that attitude towards tax-compliance has non-significant impact on tax-compliance behaviour
with Path coefficient=0.017 and p-value=0.136, for Pakistan whereas, for Turkey the relation is
significant with Path coefficient=.536 and p-value=.004, however after incorporation of the mediator
the relationship become significant between attitude and tax-compliance behaviour with Path
coefficient=.0.337 and p-value=0.005. the result suggests full mediation as per baron and Kenny
(1986). Whereas, results for Turkey showed partial mediation with Path coefficient= 0.256 and p-
value= 0.001.

The results of H2 revealed that coercive power has significant relation with voluntary tax-
compliance for both the countries with Path coefficient= -0.287, p-value= 0.006 and Path coefficient= -
0.437, p-value= 0.003 respectively, whereas with the admission of mediator the values are Path
coefficient=-0.340, p-value= 0.048 and Path coefficient=-0.397, p-value= 0.000. These results
recommend a partial mediation for both countries. For H3, the relation among the variable legitimate
power and voluntary tax-compliance is significant with path coefficient =0.214 p-value= 0.008 for
Pakistan and for indirect path the value of path coefficient= 0.301 and p-value= 0.005 suggestive of
partial mediation, same is the case for Turkey the path coefficient= 0.512 with p-value= 0.000 referring
to partial mediation with path coefficient= 0.324 and p-value= 0.011. The results of H4 were not
significant for Pakistan but interestingly they appear significant for Turkey with path coefficient= 0.137, p-value=0.136 and path coefficient= 0.329, p-value=0.000, respectively. whereas, when intention towards tax-compliance was introduced as mediator among moral obligation and voluntary tax-compliance the results were significant for both countries with path coefficient= 0.227, p-value=0.011 and Path coefficient= 0.412, p-value= 0.008. The results of H5 showed significant relation for Pakistan among perceived behavioural control and voluntary tax-compliance with path coefficient= 0.230 and p-value=0.000 and for Turkey path-coefficient= 0.348 and p-value=0.004. Moreover, the indirect results for both countries were also significant with path-coefficient= 0.310, p-value=0.006, path coefficient=-0.372, p-value=0.002 representing partial mediation for both countries. The relation between subjective norms and voluntary tax-compliance, depicted by H5 appears to be not significant with path coefficient= 0.008, p-value=0.071 for Pakistan but for Turkey results were not supported with path-coefficient= 0.159, p-value= 0.068, however the indirect path reflect that with the introduction of the mediator the relation become significant for Pakistan as well with path coefficient= 0.272, p-value= 0.007, thus consequential in full mediation Pakistan as well as Turkey indirect path showed path coefficient= 0.295,p-value= 0.009, representing full mediation. The results of H7 showed that both direct and indirect relationship were significant for variables trust and voluntary tax-compliance behaviour with path coefficient= 0.334 p-value=0.000 for Pakistan, path coefficient=0.395, p-value= 0.001 for Turkey, for indirect relation path coefficient= 0.302, p-value= 0.000 for Pakistan and for Turkey path coefficient=0.435 with p-value= 0.013 pronouncing partial mediation. Another important and interesting outcome of analysis thus performed is that the beta coefficient value for Turkey are higher as compared to Pakistan.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

The analysis section suggested that tax-compliance intention fully mediates the relation between attitude and voluntary tax-compliance behaviour for Pakistan. Whereas, partial mediation was resulted in case of Turkey. These results were also echoed by the research work done by Onu, (2016) and Akram et al., (2019). Also, it was determined that intention towards tax-compliance partially meditates the relation among coercive power and voluntary tax-compliance behaviour for both countries. However, the estimate value for Turkey was higher for Pakistan as compared to Turkey. These findings are consistent with the esteemed work done by Tjondro, et.al, (2019). It was established trough analysis that too, intention partially mediate the relation legitimate power and voluntary tax-compliance behaviour for both countries, but the effect was stronger for Turkey as Compared to Pakistan. These findings are coherent with valued work done by Kastlunger et al., (2013). Moral obligation and subjective norms as per the results of this study suggests that individuals in Pakistan does not consider it their moral obligation to pay taxes nor does they find social pressure of paying taxes but after the incorporation of mediator they feel more inclined towards paying voluntary taxes, whereas, for Turkey the individual outcome were vice versa. These outcomes were resonated by Alasfour, (2019) and Iqbal and Shohilin, (2019). Trust was analysed to be very important determinant of the voluntary tax-compliance behaviour for both the countries, with higher estimate value for Turkey rather than that of Pakistan. These results were also confirmed by Tang et al., (2019). Thereafter, it can be concluded that intention towards tax-compliance plays a very pivotal role in explaining tax-compliance behaviour. Moreover, as it can be viewed that beta value are lower for Pakistan as compared to Turkey that reflect that individual’s belonging to the countries having weak economies have lower tendency towards voluntary compliance as compared to the individuals belonging to the strong economies. Further research can be conducted by examining the tax-compliance behavior from cultural biases. Also, by incorporating more countries and higher sample size.
References


Appendix

Tables

Table 1: Sample Adequacy test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KMO and Bartlett's Test</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMO - Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.</td>
<td>.739</td>
<td>.873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartlett's Test of Sphericity</td>
<td>Approx. Chi-Square</td>
<td>11570.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>df</td>
<td>1540</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>.000</td>
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Table 2: Convergent Validity

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Sampling Country</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th></th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convergent Validity</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cronbach's Alpha</td>
<td>Composite Reliability</td>
<td>Average Variance Extracted (AVE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>0.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>0.541</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SN</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>0.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>0.865</td>
<td>0.897</td>
<td>0.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>0.709</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.557</td>
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</table>

Table 3a: Discriminant Validity (Pakistan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>MO</th>
<th>PBC</th>
<th>SN</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>LP</th>
<th>VTC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>-0.354</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>0.037</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
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<tr>
<td>SN</td>
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<td>0.059</td>
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<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>-0.181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
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<td>-0.226</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.185</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.241</td>
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<td>VTC</td>
<td>0.310</td>
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<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.352</td>
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<td>0.229</td>
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Table 3b: Discriminant Validity (Turkey)

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<th>MO</th>
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<th>SN</th>
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<th>LP</th>
<th>VTC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>-0.383</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PBC</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>-0.103</td>
<td>0.176</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.243</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
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<td>0.155</td>
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<td>T</td>
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<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.251</td>
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Table 4a: Direct and Indirect Effects using Partial least Square SEM (Pakistan vs. Turkey)

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<th>Path</th>
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<th>P Values</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Estimate (B)</th>
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<th>Results</th>
<th>Path</th>
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<td>0.536</td>
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Figure 1: path analysis of data from Pakistan and Turkey